We propose a new method of testing asset pricing models that does not rely on prices and returns but on quantities instead. We use the capital flows into and out of mutual funds to infer which risk model mutual fund investors use. Using this metric, we find that the Capital Asset Pricing Model outperforms all other models.
The field of asset pricing is primarily concerned with the question of how the riskiness of financial assets affects their price. Despite half a century of research on the topic, the field is far from a consensus view on how to adjust for risk.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), originally derived by Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) , remains controversial largely because beta does not appear to explain asset returns. As a result, in the years since the model was first proposed, financial economists have derived numerous extensions in an attempt to bring the model's predictions in line with the historic evidence. The result of this research has been mixed.
Although the extensions appear to perform better than the original model, to a large extent one would not expect otherwise. Like the epicycles that were added to the Ptolemaic planetary system, many of the extensions were derived to explain the observed shortcomings of the original model. To properly evaluate these models an independent test is required, that is, the extensions to the CAPM need to be confronted with empirical facts that they were not designed to explain. Our objective in this paper is to derive and implement such a test. The starting point of the paper is the simple insight that if the asset pricing model under consideration correctly prices risk, investors must be using it.
All capital asset pricing models assume that asset markets are perfectly competitive.
Investors compete fiercely with each other to find positive net present value investment opportunities, and in doing so, eliminate them. The consequence is that equilibrium prices are set so that the expected return of every asset is solely a function of its risk (as defined by the model under consideration). Thus, a key prediction of any capital asset pricing model is that when a non-zero net present value (NPV) investment opportunity presents itself in capital markets (that is, an asset is mispriced relative to the model) investors must react by submitting buy or sell orders until the opportunity no longer exists (the mispricing is removed).
This observation therefore implies that any investment opportunity that the model identifies as having a non-zero net present value must generate buy and sell orders. These orders reveal the preferences and beliefs of investors. If they are absent then the implication is that investors must not be using that asset pricing model, that is, that the asset pricing model under consideration does not price risk correctly. Thus, by observing whether or not buy and sell orders react to the existence of positive net present value investment opportunities, we can infer whether investors price risk using the asset pricing model under consideration.
Because capital flows are difficult to measure, researchers have shied away from using them to test asset pricing models and instead have relied exclusively on prices and/or returns to evaluate models. However, an important subset of assets are exceptional in this regard: capital flows are directly observable for actively managed mutual funds. Because the prices of actively managed mutual funds are fixed (these funds always trade for the net asset value of the assets they hold), markets can only eliminate positive net present value opportunities by either an adjustment of the fees charged by the fund, or through capital flows into, and out of, the fund. Managers rarely change their fees in practice, so markets equilibrate almost entirely through capital flows. These flows therefore reveal which asset pricing model investors are actually using.
An important advantage of using capital flows to test asset pricing models is that there is no reason why a model that has been constructed to fit price (return) data should also fit flow data. That is, the importance of additional risk factors that were added in response to the poor performance of the CAPM can be independently assessed by examining the flow of capital into investment opportunities that have positive alpha under the original model, but zero alpha under the extension. To reject the original model in favor of the extension one must also observe no capital flows into such opportunities.
Thus the mutual fund flow data provides a independent test of whether it makes sense to replace the original model with one of the extensions.
Unfortunately, our results present a mixed message for asset pricing theory. On the one hand, neither the CAPM, nor any extension of the original model, can completely explain the capital flows in and out of mutual funds. Much of the flows remain unexplained.
But on the other hand, we demonstrate that the CAPM does at least partially price risk.
Importantly, for the most part, the CAPM better explains risk than no model at all.
Furthermore, it also outperforms a naive model in which investors ignore beta and simply chase any outperformance relative to the market portfolio. Our evidence suggest that investors measure risk using the CAPM beta.
Our results reveal that investors are using the CAPM to make investment decisions.
Perhaps more surprising is that there is very little evidence that they are using any other model. Investors do not seem to be using the risk factors identified by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) . None of the models that use these factors do better than the CAPM, despite the fact that these models actually nest the CAPM. At longer horizons, models based on the dynamic equilibrium model derived by Breeden (1979) do outperform the CAPM. It is not clear why these models do better at longer horizons, but one possible explanation is that the key variable of interest, consumption, is likely to be better measured over longer horizons.
The first paper to use mutual fund flows to infer investor preferences is Guercio and Tkac (2002) . Although the primary focus of the paper is on contrasting the inferred behavior of retail and institutional investors, that paper documents that both sets of investors use the CAPM -flows respond to outperformance relative to the CAPM. They do not consider other risk models. In work subsequent to ours, Barber, Huang, and Odean (2014) use our approach and confirm our result (using slightly different methodology) that the investors use the CAPM rather than the other factor models that have been proposed. 1 1 Readers interested in the exact chronology can consult "Note on the relation between the chronology of Barber, Huang and Odean and this paper" located on our websites.
Testing Asset Pricing Theory
The core idea that underlies every financial asset pricing model in economics is that prices are set by agents chasing positive net present value investment opportunities. Under the assumption that financial markets are perfectly competitive, these opportunities are competed away so implying that, in equilibrium, prices are set to ensure that no positive net present value opportunities exist. Under the standard neoclassical assumptions that underly these models, when new information arrives, prices instantaneously adjust to eliminate any positive net present value opportunities going forward. It is important to appreciate that this price adjustment process is part of all asset pricing models, either explicitly (if the model is dynamic) or implicitly (if the model is static). The output of all these models, a prediction about expected returns, critically relies on this price adjustment process.
The importance of this price adjustment process has long been recognized by financial economists and forms the basis of the event study literature. In that literature, the correct asset pricing model is assumed to be correctly identified. In that case, because there are no positive net present value opportunities, the price change that results from new information (i.e., the part of the change not explained by the asset pricing model) measures the value of the new information.
Because prices always adjust to eliminate positive net present value investment opportunities, under the correct asset pricing model expected returns are determined by risk alone. Modern tests of asset pricing theories test this powerful insight using return data.
Rejection of an asset pricing theory occurs if positive net present value opportunities are detected, or, equivalently, if investment opportunities can be found that consistently yield returns in excess of the expected return predicted by the asset pricing model. The problem with these tests is that the empiricist can never be sure a positive net present value investment opportunity that is identified ex post was actually available ex ante.
An alternative testing approach would be to identify positive net present value investment opportunities ex ante and test for the existence of investor competition. That is, do investors react to the existence of positive net present value opportunities that result from the revelation of new information? Unfortunately, under the standard neoclassical assumptions that underly the models, for most financial assets this process is impossible to observe. As Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show, the price adjustment process occurs with no transaction volume whatsoever -competition is so fierce that no investor benefits from the opportunity. Consequently, for most financial assets the only observable evidence of this competition is the price change itself. Thus testing for investor competition is equivalent to standard tests of asset pricing theory that use return data to look for the elimination of positive net present value invest opportunities.
The key to designing a test to detect investor competition that does not rely on price data is to find an asset for which the price is fixed. In this case the market equilibration must occur through volume (quantities). A mutual fund is just such an asset. The price of a mutual fund is always fixed at the price of its underlying assets, or the net asset value (NAV). In addition, fee changes are rare. Consequently, if, as a result of new information, an investment in a mutual fund represents a positive net present value investment opportunity, the only way for investors to eliminate the opportunity is by trading the asset. Because this trade is observable, it can be used to infer which mutual funds investors believe to be positive net present value investments. One can then compare those investments to the ones the asset pricing model under consideration identifies to be positive net present value and thereby infer whether investors are using the asset pricing model. That is, by observing investors' revealed preferences in their mutual fund investments we are able to infer information about what (if any) asset pricing model they are using.
The Mutual Fund Industry
Mutual fund investment represents a large and important sector in the U.S. financial market. In the last 50 years there has been a secular trend away from direct investing.
Individual investors used to make up more than 50% of the market, today they are responsible for barely 20% of the total capital investment in U.S. markets. During that time there has been a concomitant rise in indirect investment, principally in mutual funds.
Mutual funds used to make up less than 5% of the market, today the make up 1/3 of total investment.
2 Today, the number of mutual funds that trade in the U.S. outnumber the number of stocks that trade. Berk and Green (2004) derive a model that explains how the market for mutual fund investment equilibrates that is consistent with the observed facts.
3 They start with the observation that the mutual fund industry is like any industry in the economy -at some point it must display decreasing returns to scale. 4 This observation immediately implies that in a perfectly competitive financial market, all mutual funds must have enough assets under management so that they face decreasing returns to scale. When new information arrives that convinces investors that a particular mutual fund represents a positive net present value investment, investors react by investing more capital in the mutual fund.
This process continues until enough new capital is invested to eliminate the opportunity. Thus, the model was able to explain empirical facts documented in the mutual fund literature that had puzzled financial economists. An extensive literature had documented that capital flows in and out of mutual funds are clearly not random or uninformed.
Capital flows are responsive to past returns (see Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) A key implication of the Berk and Green (2004) model is that mutual fund manager must be skilled in the sense that they are able to extract value by trading in financial markets and that this skill must vary across managers. Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) verify this fact. They demonstrate that such skill exists and is highly persistent. More importantly, for our purposes, they demonstrate that these flows contain useful information. Not only do investors systematically direct flows to higher skilled managers, but managerial compensation, which is primarily determined by these flows, predicts future performance as far out as 10 years. Investors know who the skilled managers are and compensate them accordingly. It is this observation that provides the starting point of our analysis. Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) . The data set spans the period from January 1977 to March 2011. Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) undertook an extensive data project to address several shortcomings in the CRSP database by combining it with Morningstar data, and we refer the reader to the data appendix of that paper for the details.
Private Information
Most asset pricing models are derived under the assumption that all investors are symmetrically informed. Hence, if one investor faces a positive NPV investment opportunity, all investors face the same opportunity and so it is instantaneously removed by competition. In reality, the fact that Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) find skill in mutual fund management is evidence that at least some investors have access to different information or have different abilities to process information. As a result, not all positive net present value investment opportunities are instantaneously competed away.
As Grossman (1976) argued, in a world where there are gains to collecting information and information gathering is costly, not everybody can be equally informed in equilibrium.
If everybody chooses to collect information, competition between investors ensures that prices reveal the information and so information gathering is unprofitable. Similarly, if nobody collects information, prices are uninformative and so there are large profits to be made collecting information. Thus, in equilibrium, investors must be differentially informed (see, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ). Investors with the lowest information gathering costs collect information so that, on the margin, what they spend on information gathering, they make back in trading profits. Presumably these investors are few in number so that the competition between them is limited, allowing for the existence of prices that do not fully reveal their information. As a result, information gathering is a positive net present value endeavor for a limited number of investors.
The existence of asymmetrically informed investors poses a challenge for empiricists wishing to test asset pricing models derived under the assumption of symmetrically informed investors. Clearly, the empiricist's information set matters. For example, asset pricing models fail under the information set of the most informed investor, because the key assumption that asset markets are competitive is false under that information set.
Consequently, the standard in the literature is to assume that the information set of the uninformed investors only contains the information in publicly available information, such as past prices and returns, and to conduct the test under that information set. For now, we will adopt the same strategy but will revisit this assumption in Section 6, where we will explicitly consider the possibility that the majority of investors' information sets include more information than just what is in past and present prices.
Methodology
To formally derive our testing methodology, let R n it denote the excess return (that is, the net-return in excess of the risk free rate) earned by investors in the i'th investment opportunity at time t and let R B it denote the risk adjustment prescribed by the asset pricing model under consideration. Then, define ε it as follows:
Define net alpha, denoted by α it , as the expectation of ε it given the information set at time t, that is,
The assumption that capital markets are competitive implies that conditional on the (public) information available at time t, the expectation of ε i,t+1 (the net alpha) is zero.
In the case of a mutual fund there are only two ways for markets to equilibrate: (1) the fund changes the net alpha by changing the fee it charges investors, or (2) the fund experiences an inflow or outflow of capital thereby changing the net alpha investors in the fund earn. In fact, as we will show, the latter mechanism is used almost exclusively, implying that the flow of funds into and out of mutual funds reveal investor beliefs about how the fund's alpha changes with new information.
Let the flow of capital into mutual fund i at time t be denote by F it where
That is, g(·) is the flow that results from the information available in prices and ν it is the flow that results from all other sources of new information. When the asset pricing model is correctly identified, then α it = 0. Consequently, a positive (negative) realization of ε it+1 must lead to an upward (downward) update of investors inference about α it and an inflow (outflow) of funds, implying that the function g(·) satisfies g (·) > 0 and g(0) = 0.
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We are now ready to formulate the testable prediction under the Null hypothesis that the asset pricing model under consideration holds perfectly. When the information set of the majority of investors only contains current and past prices, ν it = 0 and so from (2) and the properties of g(·) we have:
The rest of the paper provides a test of this prediction.
Asset Pricing Models
Our testing methodology can be applied to both reduced-form asset pricing models, such as the factor models proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) , as well as to dynamic equilibrium models, such as the consumption CAPM (Breeden (1979) ), habit formation models (Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ) and long run risk models (Bansal and Yaron (2004)). For the CAPM and factor models, R B it is specified by the beta relationship.
We regress the excess returns to investors, R n it , on the risk factors over the life of the fund to get the model's betas. We then use the beta relation to calculate R B it at each point in time. For example, for the Fama-French-Carhart factor specification, the risk adjustment
is then given by:
where MKT t , SML t , HML t and UMD t are the realized excess returns on the four factor portfolios. Using this risk adjusted return, ε it is calculated using (1).
In any dynamic equilibrium model returns must satisfy the following condition in equilibrium:
When this condition is violated a positive net present value investment opportunity exists.
Thus the outperformance measure ε it for fund i at time t is
Notice that ε it > 0 is a buying opportunity and so capital should flow into such opportunities. We estimate (5) over a T -period horizon (T > 1) by calculating:
To compute these outperformance measures, we must compute the stochastic discount factor for each model at each point in time. For the consumption CAPM, the stochastic discount factor is:
where β is the subjective discount rate and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The calibrated values we use are given in the top panel of Table 1 .
For the long-run risk model as proposed by Bansal and Yaron (2004) , the stochastic discount factor is given by:
where R a t is the return on aggregate wealth and where θ is given by:
The parameter ψ measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). To construct the realizations of the stochastic discount factor, we use parameter values for risk aversion and the IES commonly used in the long-run risk literature, as summarized in the middle panel of Table 1 . In addition to these parameter values, we need data on the returns to the aggregate wealth portfolio. There are two ways to construct these returns. The first way is to estimate (innovations to) the stochastic volatility of consumption growth as well as (innovations to) expected consumption growth, which combined with the parameters of the long-run risk model lead to proxies for the return on wealth. The second way is to take a stance on the composition of the wealth portfolio, by taking a weighted average of traded assets. In this paper, we take the latter approach and form a weighted average of stock and long-term bond returns to compute the returns on the wealth portfolio. We employ a collection of weights in stocks (denoted by w) to assess the robustness with respect to this assumption.
For the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit formation model, the stochastic discount factor is given by:
where S t is the consumption surplus ratio. The dynamics of the log consumption surplus ratio s t are given by:
wheres is the steady state habit, φ is the persistence of the habit stock, c t the natural logarithm of consumption at time t and g is the average consumption growth rate. We set all the parameters of the model to the values proposed in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but we replace the average consumption growth rate g, as well as the consumption growth rate volatility σ with their sample estimates over the full available sample (1959-2011), as summarized in the bottom panel of Table 1 . To construct the consumption surplus ratio data, we need a starting value. As our consumption data starts in 1959, which is long before the start of our mutual fund data in 1977, we have a sufficiently long period to initialize the consumption surplus ratio. That is, in 1959, we set the ratio to its steady state values and construct the ratio for the subsequent periods using the available data that we have. Because the annualized value of the persistence coefficient is 0.87, the weight of the starting value in the 1977 realization of the stochastic discount factor is small and equal to 0.015.
It is also possible to calculate the implied R Table 1 : Parameter Calibration The table shows the calibrated parameters for the three structural models that we test: power utility over consumption (the consumption CAPM), external habit formation preferences (as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ) and Epstein Zin preferences as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) .
equilibrium condition (4) can be express in terms of a pricing relation as follows:
where we have used the fact that the expectation of the stochastic discount factor is
], for these models we have
where we make the (strong) assumption that the conditional covariance equals its unconditional counterpart. Implementing our tests using (6) rather than (4) has the advantage that, like the factor models, Cov(M t+1 , R n it+1 ) can be estimate once using all the available data. This improves the accuracy of the estimate, which is important given the noise in consumption data. The downside is that by implementing the test this way, we are ignoring a large part of the time variation in risk premia. Because most time variation in risk premia are a central motivation behind most dynamic equilibrium models we will use (4) in most of our tests.
One could argue that the structural models that we consider are not calibrated to explain flow data, and could therefore potentially do better when the model parameters are estimated using flow data. We follow this empirical strategy in Section 5.
Results
To implement a test of (3) it is necessary to pick an observation horizon. Except for the early part of our sample, the flow data is available monthly. Because we need at least two observations to estimate (4), the shortest horizon we will consider is three months. There are a number of concerns interpreting the results from such a short horizon. First, in the early part of the sample many funds report their AUMs quarterly and so our flow data is quarterly, implying that for those funds we cannot estimate (4). Even for the funds that we can estimate (4), estimating this expectation on just three data points is likely to be very noisy. Another concern is that the distribution of M t is likely to be heavily skewed, which increases the difficulty of estimating (4) in small samples.
If investors react to new information immediately, then flows should immediately respond to performance and the appropriate horizon to measure the effect would be the shortest horizon possible. But in reality there is evidence that investors do not respond immediately. Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2008) show that the net alpha of mutual funds is predictably non-zero for horizons shorter than a year, suggesting that capital is not moving instantaneously. The is also evidence of investor heterogeneity, some investors update faster than others.
6 For these reasons, we also consider longer horizons (up to four years).
Although longer horizons provide more accurate estimates of (4), they also ignore any time variation in risk premia over the horizon. Given the tradeoffs involved we will concentrate on the one year horizon, although we will present the results for all horizons.
Model Horizon 3 month 6 month 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year Factor models are shown in red, dynamic equilibrium models in blue, and black entries are no models. The CAPM is coded in both red and blue since it can be interpreted as both a factor model and an equilibrium model. Table 2 reports our results. The striking feature in the table is the overall poor performance of all the models. The best performing model at most horizons is the single factor CAPM with the CRSP value weighted index as the market proxy. Even so, for that model, more than 40% of the time the flows do not have the same sign as the outperformance measure. It appears that existing models fail to explain a large fraction of investment decisions, especially when one recognizes that a model that explained nothing, would still satisfy (3) half the time. The tables show that at the 1-year horizon the CAPM statistically outperforms all other models. Factor models appear to do better at shorter horizons, while the dynamic equilibrium models do better at longer horizons. However, more concerning for those models is that they cannot outperform the excess return. Because the excess return is equivalent to risk neutrality, i.e., M t = 1 1+rt
, at face value this result appears to reject all these models. But there are a number of possible reasons that might explain this poor performance. First, our parameterization might not be right. We address this in Section 5 where we show that if we use flow data to infer the parameters the dynamic models do out perform the risk neutral benchmark. Second, even with a better parameterization, the dynamic models are difficult to estimate because on the one hand we need a long horizon to estimate (4) accurately, but on the other hand long horizons ignore variation in risk premia. To get a sense of this tradeoff, we re-estimate these models using 6 and show they do much better, indicating that this poor performance is likely due to estimation error.
Although the differences in Table 2 are statistically significant, they might appear small from an economic point of view. In fact, this is not the case. To get a sense of the economic significance of these differences, we can compute what these differences imply about future managerial compensation. That is, because fees are rarely changing, total managerial compensation (that is, the product of the percentage fee and the size of the fund) is determined by investors directing capital to managers they perceive to have higher ability. So by looking at the relation between future compensation and past model performance, we can get a sense of the economic magnitude of the differences between models.
We begin by sorting funds each year using all historical performance data. Following Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) , we sort funds using the skill ratio. That is, we take all historical month observations of the performance measure ε it , compute the mean and divide it by its standard error. We then isolate the top 10%, and compute, for each fund, the monthly compensation paid over the next year. For each model we then compute the average monthly compensation over our time period starting in 1980.
7 Table 6 provides the results. Notice that the differences are large, of the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars per month. Notice also that the consumption CAPM and Habit models do particularly well, indicating that these models benefit when performance is measured using the entire history of the fund. As we show in the appendix, when we estimate the dynamic models by computing the covariance over the life of the fund using (6) 
A Probit Model for Fund Flows and Asset Pricing Factors
One important assumption that we have made when implementing the reduced-form factor models, is that the asset pricing betas of the factor models are known to investors. That 7 Because we are restricting attention to the top performing funds it does not make much difference what we do with funds that go out of business over the year. In the table we assume those fund managers earn the average compensation. Assuming those managers earn 0, leads to almost identical results.
is, we have computed asset pricing betas using the full sample of available returns, and we have applied these return betas throughout the sample. One may be concerned that in reality investors are using a different beta than the one we have estimated.
In this section, we explore the explanatory power of the commonly used additional risk factors such as size and value without taking a stance on the asset pricing beta. That is, we let the flow data decide which factor exposure best explains the flow sign. To achieve this, we model the probability that fund i will receive an inflow at time t as a function of the fund's net return and the asset pricing factors under consideration using a probit model. Let Y it denote the sign of the flow to fund i at time t, where Y it = 1 denotes an inflow and Y it = 0 denotes an outflow. Then the probability of an inflow is modeled as:
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, F t is the row vector with the factor realizations, and β i is the column vector of factor loadings of fund i. We then use standard maximum likelihood optimization techniques to estimate β i . If the MLE estimate of β i is significantly different from zero for a particular factor, then this implies that the factor plays a role in the decision of investors to allocate flows to or from the mutual fund.
We estimate the discrete choice model above for each fund, using as the factors the CAPM, as well as the CAPM augmented with the size factor, and the CAPM augmented with the value factor, using quarterly data. The cross-sectional distribution of the estimates are plotted in blue in Figures 1, 2 and 3 . As a comparison, we also plot in each figure a bootstrapped distribution of factor loadings. These loadings are bootstrapped under the Null hypothesis that the factor does not enter into the decision rule of investors, that is, the factor loading is zero.
The graphs further confirm our earlier results. The cross-sectional distribution of CAPM betas is centered close to 1, with a median of 0.85, and the bootstrapped distribution of CAPM betas is substantially different from the estimated distribution. This is not true for the estimated size and value betas. Both distributions are centered around 0 (as expected), but more importantly, there only seem to be very small deviations of estimated betas relative to the randomly bootstrapped distribution of fund betas.
Probit: CAPM betas The graph shows in blue the cross-sectional distribution of estimated CAPM betas using the probit model in equation 6, where the only factor in F t is the excess return on the market portfolio. The graph also shows a bootstrapped distribution of CAPM betas (transparent), which is bootstrapped under the Null hypothesis that the market portfolio is not a relevant factor for investors when allocating flows. That is, the CAPM beta is 0.
Estimating Structural Models Using Flows
In the previous sections we have evaluated the performance of several structural asset pricing models by confronting them with quantity (flow) data. To perform this evaluation, we have taken the underlying model parameters as given. In particular, we have taken the parameter values from the existing literature, which has calibrated the parameters to best explain a set of moments such as the equity risk premium and the risk free rate. Size betas: The graph shows in blue the cross-sectional distribution of estimated size (smb) betas using the probit model in equation 6, where the two factors in F t are the excess return on the market portfolio (not plotted) and the size factor (smb). The graph also shows a bootstrapped distribution of size betas (transparent), which is bootstrapped under the Null hypothesis that size is not a relevant factor for investors when allocating flows. That is, the size beta is 0 for all funds.
These parameters are therefore not calibrated to best explain mutual fund flow data. This raises the question what set of parameter values would best explain the flow data. For this purpose, we perform a maximum likelihood estimation of the structural parameters.
The general methodology we apply is as follows. Let θ denote the vector of parameters of the asset pricing model, and let X t denote the data inputs. For example, for the long run risk model, the vector θ is given by:
and X t consists of consumption data, the aggregate returns on the value weighted stock market index and the aggregate returns on the long-term Fama-Bliss bond portfolio (60-120 months). Let us write the stochastic discount factor as a function f of θ and X t : The graph shows in blue the cross-sectional distribution of estimated value (hml) betas using the probit model in equation 6, where the two factors in F t are the excess return on the market portfolio (not plotted) and the value factor (hml). The graph also shows a bootstrapped distribution of value betas (transparent), which is bootstrapped under the Null hypothesis that value is not a relevant factor for investors when allocating flows. That is, the value beta is 0 for all funds.
Given the pricing relation
the outperformance measure ε it for fund i at time t over a T -period horizon is given by:
Without loss of generality, we normalize this outperformance measure to have a standard deviation of 1. We denote the flow sign data, where an inflow into the fund (F it > 0) is denoted by 1 and an outflow by 0, by Y it , where the cumulative flows are computed over the same horizon T as the outperformance. Finally, we model the probability that an inflow occurs as a function of the outperformance measure using a probit model:
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The likelihood function of the model is given by:
We estimate the parameters of each model by maximizing the likelihood:
The results of this estimation using annual flow data are given in Table 7 . The table
shows that the estimated parameters and the calibrated parameters are relatively close.
Using flow data, habits are estimated to be somewhat less persistent. Further, the weight of bonds in the aggregate wealth portfolio is estimated to be high and equal to 94%. 
Other Information Sets
Conceivably, the poor performance of all the models reported in the last section could result from the assumption that the information set for most investors does not include any more information than past and present prices. In Table 8 we perform this one sided test for the risk models that have at least a reasonable chance at capturing risk, that is, the models for which the sign between outperformance and flows matches up at least 50of the time. For the other models, the differential information set explanation can only make sense if there is no information regarding skill in past returns, which we regard as implausible. Consistent with our previous result, we find that only for the CAPM can we not reject the Null hypothesis that alphas are not persistent. For the Fama French and Fama French Carhart model, we find that alphas are highly persistent, thereby rejecting the Null hypothesis that the differential information set explains the lack of correlation between flows and outperformance.
Fee Changes
As argued in the introduction, flows into funds are potentially not the only equilibrating
mechanism. An alternative mechanism is that the fees that funds charge adjust. These fees are relatively stable. The fund prospectus specifies the maximum fee the fund is allowed to charge, but funds sometimes rebate some of the fee to investors. Given this, we need to investigate the possibility that instead of fund flows, the fund changes its fees to equate markets. To rule out this mechanism as a possible explanation of our results, we repeat the above analysis by combining fee changes with fund flows. That is, we test (3) by counting the number of times ε it has the same sign as either F it or a change in the fee. Clearly, if changes in fees, fund flows, and past realized risk adjusted return are unrelated, the likelihood of either flows or fees lining up with outperformance is 75% (not 50% as before). So to measure how much our original results are improved by taking fee changes into account in this way, we first measure the deviation from the expected number of matches, assuming that these quantities are unrelated, that is 75%. The only complication is that in many cases the fee change is exactly zero. To properly account for these observations, we calculate the expected number of changes without including these observations. We subtract this number from the actual count to get the improvement.
We do the same thing for the original study (there the likelihood when unrelated is 50%) and then subtract the two numbers. The results are reported in Table 9 .
It is clear that by including fee changes in this way make little difference to our results.
In most cases the difference is considerably less than a percentage point, which shows that 1) fee changes do not seem to be an important equilibrating mechanism, and 2) our earlier conclusions regarding the relative performance of the risk models remains unchanged. Table 9 : Effect of Fee Changes: The table shows the improvement of including fee changes. We first compute the percent of time ε it has the same sign as F it or a fee change and subtract this from the expected number of fee changes assuming all these quantities are unrelated. We then compute the same statistic using just F it alone. The table reports the difference between the two, that is, the model with fee changes minus the model without. Each line corresponds to a different risk model. For the long run risk model we consider three different versions, depending on the portfolio weight of bonds in the aggregate wealth portfolio. The maximum number in each column (the best performing model) is shown in bold face.
Conclusion
Nearly fifty years of research in asset pricing has been dedicated to the question of how to properly adjust cash flows for risk. Since the Capital Asset Pricing model of Sharpe (1964) , a large set of alternative models have been proposed. In this paper we have proposed an alternative way of testing the validity of an asset pricing model that instead of relying on moment conditions related to returns, uses flow data instead. Our study is motivated by revealed preference theory: if the asset pricing model under consideration correctly prices risk, then investors must be using it, and must be allocating their money based on that risk model. Our method can be used as an independent test of existing and future asset pricing models.
A Appendix
In this appendix we estimate (6) rather than (4) for the dynamic equilibrium models. The advantage of doing the estimation using this form is that we can estimate the covariance term once for each fund, thus reducing the estimation error of variables that are hard to estimate. The disadvantage is that the habit and long run risk models explicitly model time variation in risk premia. That is, this term is not constant in the models, so treating it that way in the estimation implies that we are not exactly testing the model predictions.
Tables 10 and 11 reports our results. The striking feature in the table is the difference of performance of the dynamic equilibrium models, especially at longer horizons. In fact the long run risk model with 90% of the aggregate wealth represented by bonds does far better than any other model at horizons longer than 3 or 4 years. At 4 years, both the C-CAPM and the habit model do better than the excess return (risk neutrality). Table   11 makes it clear that using this specification, the factor models do better at shorter horizons and the dynamic models do better at longer horizons. One possible reason for this pattern might be the estimation error in measuring consumption. When the models are estimated over longer horizons, the effect of this error is diminished. Tables 12 and   13 Table 13 : Statistical Significance of the Flow of Funds Alpha Relationship at the 4 year horizon): Each row shows the t-statistic of the test the the model in the row outperforms the model in the column. These statistics are computed by block bootstrapping the distribution. That is, we construct 10,000 equivalent bootstrapped databases by randomizing in time.
